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DISCUSSION 
The Petitioners, Jason Cross et al., by and through undersigned 
counsel, hereby state the following in reply to Facebook, Inc.’s Answer to 
Petition for Review and in support of the Petitioners’ Petition for Review to 
the Supreme Court for review of the decision of the Court of Appeal, First 
Appellate District, issued on August 9, 2017.  The Respondent only raised 
four issues in its Answer, which the Petitioners reply to in order.  (See 
Answer at 19-31). 
I. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD REVIEW WHETHER THE 
ANTI-SLAPP STATUTE (CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 425.16) 
APPLIES TO CAUSES OF ACTION THAT ARE NOT BASED ON 
THE DEFENDANT’S FREE SPEECH  
 
California’s anti-SLAPP statute states: “A cause of action against a 
person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right 
of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the 
California Constitution . . . .”  (Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16(b)(1).)  The 
statute states that it pertains to “any act of that person in furtherance of the 
person’s right of petition or free speech.”  (Id. [emphasis added].)  The 
Petitioners have sought review of whether the anti-SLAPP statute applies to 
the case at bar, even though (1) the claims were based on contractual rights, 
publicity rights, and negligence, rather than defamation or the Respondent’s 
free speech rights and (2) the free speech at issue was that of third parties and 
not the Respondent.  (See Petition at 8-12.) 
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The Respondent, however, has stated that this review is not 
worthwhile.  (See Answer at 19-23.)  The Respondent summarily states that 
the anti-SLAPP statute applies to all of the causes of action and then cites the 
Court of Appeal reasoning of which the Petitioners presently request review.  
(Id. at 20-21.)  While the Respondent cites three non-Supreme Court cases 
in support of its opinion that the breach of contract claim was actually about 
the Respondent furthering its own free speech, the Respondent fails to even 
mention why the statute should apply to the publicity rights, unfair trade 
practices, and negligence-based causes of action.  (See id. at 19-23 [citing 
Greater Los Angeles Agency on Deafness, Inc. v. Cable News Network, Inc. 
(9th Cir. 2014) 742 F.3d 414, 424-25; Hupp v. Freedom Communications, 
Inc. (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 398, 403; Kronemyer v. Internet Movie Data 
Base, Inc. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 941, 947].)   
At most, the Respondent’s free speech would be incidental subject 
matter to the breach of contract claim and would be largely, if not wholly, 
irrelevant to proving breach of contract, publicity rights, unfair trade 
practices, and negligence-based causes of actions.  The Petitioners find it 
revealing that the Respondent, while addressing the breach of contract claim, 
has not even argued why the anti-SLAPP should apply to all six causes of 
action.  (See Answer at 19-23.)   
The Petitioners believe that the anti-SLAPP statute requiring private 
citizens to pay the copious attorney’s fees of global corporations, such as the 
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Respondent, for claims such as breach of contract, publicity rights 
deprivations, unfair trade practices, and negligence whenever anyone’s 
speech is even remotely involved would be a distortion of the meaning and 
purpose of the anti-SLAPP statute.  (See Code of Civil Procedure 
§ 425.16(b)(1) [stating that the statute applies to “[a] cause of action against 
a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s 
right of petition or free speech . . .”] [emphasis added].)  Therefore, the 
Petitioners believe that it is critical for the Supreme Court to review the 
applicability of the anti-SLAPP statute to matters such as the case at bar 
because the current precedent now set forth by the Court of Appeal that 
allows large corporations to collect attorney fees from private citizens for 
these basic causes of action will severely chill the ability of citizens to 
petition for the redress of their grievances, which is exactly the purpose that 
the Legislature intended for the anti-SLAPP statute.  (See Code of Civil 
Procedure § 425.16(a) [stating the enormous importance of “the valid 
exercise of constitutional rights [to] petition for the redress of grievances” 
and that the legislature declared “that it is in the public interest to encourage 
continued participation in matters of public significance, and that this 
participation should not be chilled through abuse of judicial process.”]; see 
also Petition at 9-12.)  As the Petition and Answer have shown, there is 
limited case law to guide citizens in this matter and the Petitioners believe 
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that it is ripe for the California Supreme Court to review this important matter 
of public interest.  (See Petition at 8-12; Answer at 19-23).  
II. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD REVIEW WHETHER THE 
COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT (47 U.S.C. § 230) BARS NON-
DEFAMATORY CLAIMS BASED ON AN INTERACTIVE 
COMPUTER SERVICES PROVIDER’S OWN ACTIONS 
The Communications Decency Act (CDA) states: “No provider or 
user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or 
speaker of any information provided by another information content 
provider.”  (47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).)  The Petitioners sought to hold the 
Respondent responsible for its own actions and, therefore, filed breach of 
contract, negligent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation with 
business relations, deprivation of publicity rights, and unfair trade practices 
claims.  The Petitioners only sought to hold the Respondent liable for its own 
actions in this case and, therefore, neither sued any third party nor filed any 
defamation-based claims.  The Court of Appeal, however, concluded that the 
Petitioner’s breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, and negligent 
interference with business relations causes of actions were barred by the 
CDA because they treated the Respondent as the “publisher or speaker” of 
“information provided by another content provider.”  (47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1); 
see Opn. at 15.)   
The Respondent also concluded that it was being treated as the 
publisher or speaker of another information content provider’s information 
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and, therefore, was immune from the Petitioners’ breach of contract, 
negligent misrepresentation, and negligence interference with business 
relations causes of action.  (See Answer at 24-25.)  It seems wholly 
inconsistent that the Respondent claims that it is the speaker of content on its 
internet site for anti-SLAPP purposes, but then contradictorily claims that it 
is in no way the speaker of content for CDA purposes.   (Id. at 19-26.)  In 
any regard, a CDA analysis in the present context seems largely, if not 
wholly, independent from proving the present causes of action.  The 
Petitioners sought to hold the Respondent liable for its own actions, namely 
whether the Respondent made and breached a contract, negligently 
misrepresented, or negligently interfered with business relations.  These 
claims are independent of the CDA because these common causes of action 
did not seek to hold the Respondent liable for being the publisher of another’s 
content, but rather merely responsible for its own actions.   
Allowing an interactive computer service provider to make and breach 
contracts, negligently misrepresent, or negligently interfere with the business 
relations of citizens and then use CDA immunity so that the citizens cannot 
even bring forth those claims is a very important public matter.  The Court 
of Appeal’s ruling would seem to be antithetical to the CDA and laws of 
California.  It is important to remember that the present discussion refers to 
immunity, meaning whether or not a potential plaintiff can even pursue 
redress for certain grievances in court.  Immunity means that the Respondent 
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could actually breach contracts, negligently misrepresent, and negligently 
interfere with business relations and not be liable.  Unless the Supreme Court 
reviews this case, the current precedent from the Court of Appeal would 
allow this to happen. Petitioners believe that it is a matter of great public 
concern and ripe for the Supreme Court to review how citizens can petition 
for the redress of their grievances via basic causes of action, such as breach 
of contract and negligence-based claims. Petitioners believe that this new 
precedent grants extremely broad immunity to corporations such as the 
Respondent in a manner that contradicts the meaning of the CDA and would 
prevent many citizens from receiving redress for legitimate claims.  (See 
Petition at 13.)     
III. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD REVIEW WHETHER THE 
STATUTORY DEPRIVATION OF RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY CAUSE 
OF ACTION (CIVIL CODE § 3344) SHOULD BE REVIEWED IN 
THIS MODERN INTERACTIVE COMPUTER SERVICES AND 
INTERNET ADVERTISING CONTEXT 
 
California’s right of publicity law states: “Any person who knowingly 
uses another’s name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness, in any 
manner, on or in products, merchandise, or goods, or for purposes of 
advertising or selling, or soliciting purchases of, products, merchandise, 
goods or services, without such person’s prior consent . . . shall be liable for 
any damages sustained by the person or persons injured as a result thereof.”  
(Civil Code § 3344.)  The Petitioners have stated that this matter is very 
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important and ripe for review by the Supreme Court, particularly with regard 
to the Code’s meaning of “knowing use” of another’s publicity rights “in any 
manner . . . for purposes of advertising.”  (Id.; see Petition at 17.) 
The Respondent readily concludes that this important area of law, 
particularly in the modern technological context, has no need for a 
declaration by the Supreme Court.  (See Answer at 27-30.)  To support its 
conclusion, however, the Respondent offers no Supreme Court precedent on 
point.  (Id.)  The Respondent merely cites non-Supreme Court cases to 
support uncontroverted basic statutory requirements, such as the “use” 
requirement, and fails to accurately acknowledge or comprehend the 
Petitioners’ legitimate request that the Supreme Court determine the meaning 
of the statutory language as applied to this modern technological context.  
(See Id. at 27 [citing Montana v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc. (1995) 34 
Cal.App.4th 790, 793; Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc. (C.D. Cal. July 30, 
2010), No. CV 04-9484 AHM SHX, 2010 WL 9479060 at *13].)  The 
Petitioners likewise find it interesting that the Respondent argues that the 
Respondent had no responsibility or involvement with the internet content in 
the publicity rights context, yet argues that the same content constituted its 
own free speech in the anti-SLAPP context.  (See Answer at 19-30.) 
The Petitioners properly alleged its rights of publicity cause of action 
and seek to hold the Respondent responsible for its actions.  The Respondent 
used the Petitioners’ publicity rights for advertising revenue and thus 
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violated Civil Code § 334.  These violations contained “knowing use” both 
because Petitioner Cross specifically contacted the Respondent about the 
content and the Respondent’s advertising methods have become increasingly 
sophisticated in the modern context.  Currently, parties seemingly must look 
to the non-binding 2010 federal district court case Perfect 10, which is likely 
premised on outdated factual premises, for instruction in this regard.  It is 
clear that the time is ripe for Supreme Court review of Civil Code § 334.  
(See Perfect 10 (C.D. Cal. July 30, 2010) No. CV 04-9484 AHM SHX, 2010 
WL 9479060 at *13.)   
IV. ALL LEGAL ISSUES ARE RIPE FOR REVIEW  
The crux of the Respondent’s Answer is that the relevant areas of law 
are “well-established.”  (See Answer at 19 [“established law”], 22 [“clear 
case law”], 24 [“established law”], 26 [“well-established law”], 27 [“well-
settled law”], 28 [“uncontroversial conclusion”], 30-31 [“well-established 
principles of law”].)  Yet, it seems that the Respondent was unable to find 
Supreme Court cases that supported its substantive conclusions that these 
areas of law are well-established.  (Id.)  In fact, it seems that in the Court of 
Appeal opinion, the Petition for Review, and the Answer to Petition for 
Review, there were very few citations to any Supreme Court cases, and, in 
the Petitioners’ opinion, there were no Supreme Court cases that were 
directly on point.  This seems to be very telling and bolsters the Petitioners’ 
request to the Supreme Court for its review to settle these very important 
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matters of law.  Of course, even if the Supreme Court had previously declared 
on a matter, it could review its reasoning and precedent, yet even that does 
not seem to be the situation with the present legal issues. 
 At multiple points in its Answer, the Respondent stated that the 
Petitioners should have petitioned the Court of Appeal for a rehearing and 
that a factual record would be needed for review of the matters set forth in 
the Petition.  (See Answer at 18, 22-23, 29.)  The Petitioners have only sought 
review of legal issues that were declared upon by the Court of Appeal.  
Furthermore, the Petitioners seek, on remand, the opportunity to have their 
claims persist at the superior court so that they can pursue relevant discovery.  
It is common knowledge that the multi-billion-dollar company that is 
Facebook, Inc., receives much internet advertising revenue from its very 
intentional and particularized advertising platforms.  Facebook, Inc., does 
not charge for its basic services, yet has massive revenue due to its use of 
other persons’ intellectual property, which creates enormous internet traffic 
to its site and customers for its advertisements.  The extent of these activities 
as determined by factual finding at the superior court would be necessary to 
determine specific calculations such as monetary damages from the 
deprivation of publicity rights in the case at bar.  At the present time, the 
Petitioners have only sought review of legal issues that are indeed ripe for 
review by the Supreme Court.   
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CONCLUSION 
 
The matters in the case at bar are essential for the people of the State 
of California and the United States of America as a whole.  Currently, the 
Petitioner believes that precedent has been made that would chill citizens’ 
attempts to petition for the redress of their grievances if they are forced to 
pay the large attorney fees of internet companies via the anti-SLAPP statute, 
immunize these companies from basic breach of contract and negligence-
based claims via the Communications Decency Act, and allow widespread 
deprivations of publicity rights.  The Petitioner additionally believes that this 
current precedent bolsters Facebook, Inc.’s inconsistent positions that it is 
the speaker of content for anti-SLAPP purposes, but should not be treated as 
the speaker or publisher for CDA purposes and in no way has knowing use 
of this content for publicity rights purposes, even though it uses the content 
to gain advertising revenue.  Thus, there are important questions of law for 
which the Supreme Court can provide clarity and consistency.  For these and 
the aforementioned reasons in the Petition for Review, the Petitioners 
respectfully ask the Supreme Court to settle the important questions of law 
contained herein. 
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